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 En este artículo se defenderá una 
concepción de la memoria basada en los 
últimos avances neurocientíficos. Des-
pués, se expondrá y elaborará una pro-
puesta para entender la narratividad -que 
habitualmente ha sido considerada un 
cierto tipo de identidad, la identidad na-
rrativa- como un inveterado potenciador 
de la memoria. Para fundamentar esta 
tesis, explicaremos cómo la narratividad 
refuerza la memoria y compararemos la 
narratividad con otros potenciadores de 
la memoria.
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In this paper we will defend a new 
understanding of memory based on the 
latest neuroscientific research. Then we 
will expose and elaborate a proposal to 
understand narrativity -which has usua-
lly been considered a certain type of 
identity, narrative identity- as an antique 
memory enhancer. To prove our point, 
we will explain how narrativity reinforces 
memory, and we will compare narrativity 
to other memory enhancers
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Neuroscience has progressed immensely in the last decades. The same can be 
said about brain manipulating and brain investigating technologies. But only recently 
we have started to discuss seriously about the possibility of memory enhancement. 
However, in most cases, this memory enhancement discussion has been carried out 
with old, flawed conceptions of memory. In this paper, we will first try to show why 
we can no longer operate under old categories regarding memory. We will then pro-
pose a new, alternative understanding of memory. Finally, we will explain why narra-
tivity can and should be considered a memory enhancer, the first and original one.
2. A new understanding of memory
Memory has typically been considered as a storage system of recollections. We 
see something, we keep that sight in our head, and we bring it back as a memory 
when needed. This view of memory matches, to some extent our experience -even 
though is important to note that our experience is mediated precisely by this con-
ception of memory. Despite this, neuroscience has been demonstrating, now for a 
long time, that this view of memory doesn’t hold scrutiny. For two main reasons: 
human biological memory doesn´t strictly store anything, and what we recall is 
never the same thing we first saw or experienced.
Humans, as many other biological organism, are concerned with survival, and 
our memory is focused on that; not on having truthful memories or many of them. 
In fact, both of these characteristics can be detrimental in many contexts, as cases 
like the one of Solomon Shereshevsky show (Luria, 1987). Our memory retains 
very little information and emphasizes creation. Our memory doesn’t aim for data, 
it aims for meaning. As Quian Quiroga explains, memory is “based on the cons-
truction of meaning, an interpretation of the outside world that relies on selecting 
a minimum of information and making abstractions – while discarding a multitude 
of detail” (2017, p. 48) 1.
1  Konrad et al. go on more detail explaining that “Organic memory has four different strategic biases. First, people 
tend to remember more positive than negative events [Walker et al. 2003]. Second, negative details of individual 
events are forgotten more than positive details [Mitchell et al. 1997]. Third, there is an emotional asymmetry 
in the time course of past events with negative affect fading more rapidly than positive affect [Walker and 
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As neuroscience explains (O´Shea 2005), the key to memory are neuronal sy-
napses and their strength (O´Shea, 2005, p. 98). Nobel Prize winner E. Kandel 
discovered that there are a particular kind of neurons, modulatory neurons, which 
can strengthen the synapses between the sensory neurons and the motor neurons 
(O´Shea, 2005, p. 95). What the modulatory neurons basically do is start a process 
which involves a synaptical serotonin secretion, that triggers cyclic AMP, which in 
turn activates kinase, which modifies the properties of some particular proteins by 
adding a phosphate molecule to them (O´Shea, 2005, p. 95-96). This phosphoryla-
tion delays the connection between sensory and motor neurons from disappearing, 
strengthening their connection and making their future connections easier. When 
this phosphorylation is temporary, it produces short-term memory; when it is sta-
ble (because is gene induced), it produces long-term memory. This depends prima-
rily on the number of times the modulatory neurons repeat this process, which in 
turn depends on the number of times the action triggering the modulatory neuron 
is repeated (O´Shea, 2005, p. 96-97). This highly technical explanation is set forth 
in a simpler way by Liao and Sandberg:
Our best present account of how long-term memory works on the biological level says 
that experiences cause patterns of neural activity among neurons in the brain. Neurons 
activated at the same time and connected to each other through synaptic connections 
then become more strongly connected through a process called longterm potentiation 
(LTP). LTP in turn makes the overall network of neurons that were activated by the 
original experience more likely to become activated as a whole when given stimulation 
similar to the original stimuli, enabling recreation of past active states and associations 
(2008, p. 87)
All the previous exposition was aimed at showing how flawed the common con-
ception of memory is. When a new memory is formed, our brain doesn´t store it in 
any sort of container. As Liao and Sandberg explain, “While it is common to speak 
of memory’s being “stored”, memories are not spatially localized. They are spread 
across different structures, likely as distributed networks of potentiated synapses” 
(2008, p. 87). What our brain does when we remember is much closer to a group 
of hikers that traverse a forest thanks to signalled trees and rocks, signals that were 
made precisely to make sure they could move along the forest without getting lost. 
Remembering, from this perspective, is not collecting some storaged thing, but 
re-walking a previously signalled path. Therefore, the “signalled trails in the forest” 
Skowronski 2009]. Finally, the ways that people view past events become less self-focused over time, indicating 
adaptive distancing from negative experiences [Campbell and Pennebaker 2003]” (Konrad et al. 2016, p. 2)
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metaphor gives a much better account of human memory. As we will see, narrati-
vity is also a key human capacity that matches perfectly this new, more accurate, 
conception of memory.
3. Narrativity as memory enhancement
Narrativity has usually been treated as a type of identity, narrative identity. 
Philosophers who have studied this topic (Schechtman, 1996; Lindemann Nelson, 
2001) have noted the importance of narrativity in the constitution of human iden-
tity. In a sense, philosophers as Ortega y Gasset (1935) or Ricoeur (1991; 1995) 
were even more radical proposing that all human life, not only identity, is directly 
affected by this human narrative constitution. In any case, we will leave aside this 
discussion about the scope of narrativity, focusing on the proposal we announced 
of considering it a memory enhancer.
Personal identity discussions often revolve around “psychological continuity”. 
This concept, rediscovered and elaborated most notably by Derek Parfit (1984), is 
the basis of the psychological view on identity. The central idea of the psychological 
view is that personal identity consists in the “continuity of a mental history over 
time, where present and past transient moments of awareness are connected by 
memory” (DeGrazia, 2005, p. 14) 2. We have no other choice that to leave aside the 
vast bibliography regarding this topic. However, it is clear that the psychological 
view and the idea of psychological continuity are firmly based on the old, flawed 
conception of memory we previously criticised. This could make us discredit the 
psychological view on identity; and while I would definitely say that psychological 
identity is a far from perfect theory, I believe psychological continuity points to a 
shared and common experience that, nonetheless, can be better explained with the 
elements we have been gathering.
What I propose is that what has usually been called “psychological continuity” is 
the experience produced by an inveterate memory enhancer: narrativity. Thanks to 
narrativity we create a memory reinforcement loop by which we can “remember” 
much more than what we can do by pure biological means; we can (re)identify 
ourselves in time and project us from the past to the future.  Of course, capacity for 
narrativity is biologicaly rooted; but just the same as capacity for any other tool usa-
ge. If we didn´t have hands like the ones we have and the neurological features that 
2  For some relevant literature on identity: Shoemaker (1963); Wiggins (1967); Williams (1970); Parfit (1984); 
Ricoeur (1995); Schechtman (1996); Olson (1997); Martin (1998); Baker (2000); and McMahan (2002).
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allow us to move them adequately, we could not use a hammer. Using language, 
our most fundamental tool, requires these same conditions: a voice tract composed 
of the laryngeal cavity, the pharynx, the oral cavity, and the nasal cavity; and the 
neurological features that enable our use of it.
Narrativity is our original and most important memory enhancer, which also 
functions as a (re)identificator. These memory enhancers are also, in some way, 
identity enhancers, or even identity enablers. But we should not confuse the 
enhancer, even the enabler, with the enhanced/enabled thing itself: narrativity is 
an aid for memory and, particularly, for identity, but narratitivity is not identity 
itself. For this reason, I prefer not to talk about “narrative identity”, but to con-
sider our narrative as a pillar of our identity. Delving on narrativity, especially 
on its connection with brain processes would require a much longer article and 
would raise many other issues 3. What we can do is refer to a couple of authors 
very relevant to this matter: Stiegler and Clowes. Stiegler developed his propo-
sal regarding memory in his three volume monumental work Technics and time 
(1998; 2009; 2010). In this work the French philosopher develops his compre-
hension of technics as an externalization of memory, considering language the 
first and most fundamental technique. Clowes has also worked on this topic 
giving very interesting insights. This author establishes the difference between 
E-memory (electronic memory) and O-memory (organic memory), and how 
one interacts with the other. And, very importantly for our argumentation, he 
defends that memory enhancement technologies are much older that what we 
are used to think:
If there is little doubt that we have seen a technical E-Memory revolution, then 
should we expect that our O-Memory systems will change and adapt to accommodate 
it? Before tackling this question directly, however, it is worth asking whether what we 
are seeing is really novel. E-Memory is far from being the first technology to change 
how we use our organic systems. Arguably, the history of the human race is in part of 
3  As we stated, this is an extremely complicated field, in which even the specialists admit their ignorance: “Even 
if we know something about neurophysiology, we know almost nothing about how neurophysiology gives rise 
to concepts, judgments and reasonings, that is, the higher mental functions. It follows that any time we are 
discussing about them in correlation with human identity and brain (or a part of it) transplantation, we are 
discussing something we do not know enough about.” (Boniolo, 2005, 51). I consider one of the best insights on 
this matter Gallagers words: “The autobiographical or narrative self emerges in reflective awareness and involves 
longer-term processes of memory and language. There is good reason to think that narrative aspects of self relate 
to parts of the brain known as cortical midline structures (CMSs), which have been associated with processing 
information related to self-reflective processes. The CMSs, however, cover quite a number of brain regions 
and involve a multitude of connections with subcortical areas that may relate reflective processes to a sense of 
embodied self. The widespread nature of the CMSs suggests that there is no specialised brain area responsible 
for generating the self.”) (Gallagher, 2016, p. 124). However, a thorough discussion with this approach and its 
terminology is impossible to carry out in this paper.
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the history of how our O-Memory systems have been undergoing a constant process of 
elaboration and adaptation as we have created wave after wave of extended memory te-
chnologies (Donald 2001; Vygotsky 1978). From spoken language—if it can be counted 
a technology (Donald 1993)—through drawing and painting (Mithen 1996), to the 
development of counting systems, knots in rope, to writing systems (Olson 1994; Ong 
1982), the development of record-keeping bureaucracies, the whole history of human 
art and technology can be seen as a history of revolutions in memory. And that is not 
even to make mention of techniques which have sought to reorganise (generally, upgra-
de) human memory, from classical training in mnemotechnics, to the medieval use of 
memory palaces (Olson 1994), to the rote-learning systems practiced in twentieth-cen-
tury schools. All of these inventions can be seen as important historical moments when 
our relationship with the technology of memory has undergone fundamental changes. 
(Clowes, 2015, p. 266)
Clowes doesn’t mention narrativity, but I believe it could and should be inclu-
ded as a memory enhancement dispositive. The “psychological continuity” which 
narrativity produces, is an internal process; but narrativity itself has many traces 
of being an external, artefactual reality. Narratives shape our brain in the sense 
that they conform and pave the neural pathways that constitute memories. And 
in the same way shoes help us walking, but also modelate our feet in the process; 
narrativity similarly is shaped in the form our biological memory really is (not as 
a container but as a recurrent loop), and also transforms in subtle ways how our 
memory functions.
By narrating and re-narrating our story, neural pathways are strengthened, crea-
ting memories that ultimately constitute our identity. When we need to remember 
something, we unconsciously start telling ourselves a story. “Where are the car’s 
keys?” makes us start a story along the following lines: “The last time I took the car 
was yesterday, when I went to the supermarket; I came back home carrying bags 
and I left the keys on my coat, instead of leaving the keys in the entrance bowl”. 
When we recall these events, the elements we actually are reproducing are minimal. 
Our visual, tactile impressions are long gone in our brain; but thanks to narrativity, 
it doesn’t matter, and we can recreate the story that gives us the information we 
need (in this case, where can the keys be) 4.
4  In this regard, it is very interesting to think about memory in babies and childs. Why don’t we remember 
anything, or almost anything, from those first years of our life? If our memory was some sort or receptacle, we 
should be able to retrieve memories old and new. But this is not the case. The explanation we can elaborate 
from what we are exposing, is that babies and childs cannot remember because they hadn’t fully developed the 
memory enhancer that narrativity is. They only do this after a neverending practice in form of bedtime tales, an 
appetite for stories that can only be explained as a evolutionary inclination implanted because of the utility and 
importance of narrativity (of memory enhancement) for human life.
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4. Conclusion
To sum it up, we have criticised the common understanding of memory, showing 
that storage and fidelity are not really characteristics of human memory. Then, 
we explained what neuroscience tells about memory, showing that memory is the 
strengthening of neuronal synapses that create neural pathways that are easier to 
recreate. This more accurate and updated comprehension of memory was then put 
in relation with narrativity, arguing that narrativity is not a form of identity, but 
a memory enhancement dispositive that created the experience of “psychological 
continuity”. By telling and retelling our story, we create the memory (strengthened 
neural pathways) that constitutes our identity.
Of course, changing the way we usually think and talk is very difficult. Making 
ordinary people stop talking about memory as a container could prove simply im-
possible. However, applying this new understanding of memory, and understan-
ding the role of narrativity in human life, would bring many benefits. We would 
understand ourselves better, some identity problems would be solved and, presu-
mably, we would life fuller lives. Especially in the case of narrativity, understanding 
its role and power in human life could change our mentality, making us more 
proactive in the stories we tell ourselves. Also, the view of narrativity as a memory 
enhancer should change our view on the latest, technological memory enhancers, 
showing that they aren’t a novelty, but only the latest step in the very long history 
of memory enhancers -a history almost as old as humanity itself.
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